Three more take-aways from ‘The Cost of Loyalty’ by Tim Bakken, a law professor at West Point
An extremely well-researched and documented book which largely dealt with upper-rank military malfeasance with a good deal of the same within the ranks of military academy students, in combination with my own experiences. (In addition to “You’re Not One Of Us”)
1) We’ve lost ALL our recent wars
There’s an interesting correlation between the lowering of the academies’ IQ and over-all accreditation acceptance requirements since 1945, as well as the fact that the U.S. hasn’t won a war in over 75 years. Bakken claims that the academies since 1945 have been accepting students into their military officer training programs that wouldn’t be accepted in many local and state universities. Once on active duty, previous academy graduates loyally ‘protect’ and advance the more recent graduates coming into the various branches. The fact that America has technological superiority—developed, incidentally, by ‘outside’ commercial military-industrial companies known to hire the best-and-brightest technical minds—has been regularly offset by those of North Korean, North Vietnamese, Iraqi, and Iranian combatants out-thinking the American invaders. Similarly, George Washington out-thought the regular British and hired Hussein armies in our Revolutionary war. Likewise, Pershing (WWI) and Eisenhower (WWII) and their respective staffs typically out-thought their respective German and Japanese opposing forces.
2) American Police Atrocities
Police departments typically welcom applications from ex-military members. These are people who, as pointed out elsewhere in this website, were trained even as their brains have still been developing to dehumanize and kill ‘the enemy.’ One study found that 19 percent of police officers are military veterans. “Veterans account for 13 percent of the adult population, but more than a third of the adult perpetrators of the 43 worst mass killings since 1984 have been in the US military”.
P. 201: “In conducting possibly the first study of its kind, researchers at the University of Texas in 2018 found ‘that Dallas police officers (a sample of 516) who were military veterans were much more likely to fire their guns while on duty than police officers who were not veterans’. The cops who had been deployed — though most deployed soldiers work in support positions who do not see combat — were 2.9 times and the nondeployed 1.94 times more likely to have fired their guns. The researchers found that ‘close to one-third of officers involved in a shooting had a military background, according to the Marshall Project, the criminal justice reform group that sponsored the study’”.
“Unnecessary and unchecked aggression and violence, inside and outside America, are some of the consequences of a large standing army”.
p. 250: “When U.S. soldiers are abroad, they are immune from a country’s laws under a status-of-forces agreement between the united states and that country, a condition on which the United States insists”. (A situation mentioned elsewhere on this website and a particularly strong point of contention between the citizens of Okinawa, Japan and the U.S. governments.)
p.251: “The absence of fairness and the military’s separation from domestic and international norms allow soldiers to feel they are uniquely powerful and righteous”.
Some honest police officers have stated how, when they donned donated military protective gear they felt more combative, more aggressive and I suggest that simply donning their uniforms, guns, taser holsters and etc. has a similar effect, particularly for military veterans.
Another incident (In addition to “You’re Not One Of Us”) I had completely forgotten about until I read this book:
Once I had been accepted into the USAF Airman Education and Commissioning Program (AECP) and obtained my BS in Aerospace (Mechanical) Engineering, I was sent to Officer Training School. Officer Training School is also unofficially referred to as the “90-day-wonder” school where, as at the academies, there were “upper” and “lower” students, the “upper” (second half of class) students being senior and used in regular Saturday morning inspections of the “lower” students. Being prior service, as an ‘upper’ student, I was assigned a small team of prior civilians for these Saturday morning inspections and an area to inspect.
After one such Saturday morning, I was being VERY closely questioned as to why my team hadn’t found more “gigs” of one particular barracks. I finally convinced the captain doing the questioning that it was because that barrack’s occupants were “that good” at their housework. It was obvious the questioning captain “had it in for” them, expecting my team to eliminate that barracks from winning that morning’s “lowest gigs” competition.
It hadn’t occurred to me until I read this book, but “that barracks” that had so interested the captain was composed mostly of ethnic Asian students who were also officer candidates. It was obvious at the time, but that captain’s skepticism and questioning was also coming from someone above him. So, (A) WHY the negative emphasis on an Asian contingent of officer candidates? And (B) since the military had been de-segregated in July 1948 by Truman’s Executive Order 9981, HOW was it that, in 1967, there existed an entire barracks-full of ethnic Asian officer candidates, separate from us occidental candidates? Velly Intellesting, and supports many of Bakken’s observations of the military strictly being ‘a law unto itself’!